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Traumatic Memory and Holocaust Testimony: Passing Judgement 
in Representations of Chaim Rumkowski 
 
Adam Brown 
 
To testify is always, metaphorically, to take the 
witness stand, or to take the position of the wit-
ness insofar as the narrative account of the wit-
ness is at once engaged in an appeal and 
bound by an oath.1
 
A fundamental characteristic of the Holocaust was the unresolvable, 
arguably unprecedented, ethical dilemmas that confronted many of its Jew-
ish victims. The traumatic experiences of Jews imprisoned within concen-
tration camps and ghettos not only included physical and emotional tor-
ment, but also frequently consisted of being coerced into making decisions 
− what Lawrence Langer terms choiceless choices − at the expense of  
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fellow inmates.2 In dealing with situations such as these, contemporary un-
derstandings and representations face great obstacles, especially when it 
comes to the question of passing moral judgement. Even survivor testimo-
nies are challenged by this problem. Alan Mintz writes that Jewish collabo-
ration was rife and the object of deep and implacable hatred on the part of 
Jews who were its victims.3 Indeed, as the above epigraph suggests, 
judgement may itself be considered an inherent part of the testimonial act. 
In 1986, Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi published a highly influential 
essay on this very theme. He called it The Grey Zone.4 Levis essay ad-
dresses the highly complex and sensitive issue of prisoners who, in re-
sponse to dehumanising and life-threatening persecution, compromised 
themselves by collaborating, to borrow the commonly used terms, with 
their Nazi captors. A key example Levi uses is Chaim Rumkowski, the con-
troversial Judenrat (Jewish Council) official of the Lodz ghetto. Responding 
to the simplifying effects of the judgements he sees contained within popu-
lar histories and films, Levi argues that one should not pass judgment on 
Jews who found themselves in extreme situations. His concept of the grey 
zone holds that certain privileged Jews, including Rumkowski, should not 
be condemned or absolved for their behaviour in extremis, suggesting that 
representations of these victims require sustained ambiguity. However, 
even Levi himself struggles to withhold judgement when discussing Rum-
kowski. 
This paper will explore the theoretical tensions within Levis concept of 
the grey zone, and expose what may be termed a paradox of judgment − 
the perceived need to withhold judgement and the simultaneous compul-
sion to pass it. To illustrate this, Levis paradigmatic analysis of Rumkowski 
will be compared with the treatment of the Jewish leader in more recent 
survivor testimonies. It will be shown that in spite of Levis call to abstain 
from judgement, representations of Rumkowski often condemn him for his 
behaviour, revealing the volatile nature of traumatic memory. Nonetheless, 
some testimonies also exhibit self-reflexive moments that appear to ques-
tion the possibility of moral evaluation, and perhaps move towards an ac-
knowledgement of the ambiguity that Levi recommends. To varying ex-
tents, the paradox of judgement at the heart of the grey zone is visible in 
all of the testimonies examined.  
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I. Primo Levi’s “Grey Zone” and the Problem of Judgement and Rep-
resentation 
The condition of the offended does not exclude culpability, and this 
is often objectively serious, but I know of no human tribunal to which 
one could delegate the judgement (29). 
When one is faced with a catastrophic event such as the Holocaust, moral 
judgement is widely perceived to be essential, if not obligatory. However, 
when confronted with the extreme circumstances of so-called privileged 
Jews under Nazi persecution, it may be impossible to pass judgement on 
them. Impossibility here does not infer that one is literally unable to pass 
judgement on privileged Jews − far from it, as the following analysis will 
reveal. Instead, the impossibility of judgement refers to the perceived in-
validity or inappropriateness of all moral evaluation, an impotentia judi-
candi. This is the problem that Levis essay on the grey zone engages 
with. While he maintains that the perpetrators of the Holocaust must be 
judged for their actions, he warns that judgments of their victims under cer-
tain circumstances should be withheld. 
The Grey Zone is a crucial part of Levis engagement with his 
Auschwitz experience, and is arguably the most influential essay on the 
Holocaust ever written, having been appropriated, often uncritically, in the 
fields of Holocaust Studies, philosophy, law, history, theology, feminism 
and popular culture.5 The recent feature film entitled The Grey Zone (Lions 
Gate, 2001) is also inspired by Levis essay. The concept of the grey zone 
is essentially a metaphor for moral ambiguity, a conceptual realm that Levi 
characterises as having ill-defined outlines which both separate and join 
the two camps of masters and servants. It possesses an incredibly compli-
cated internal structure, and contains within itself enough to confuse our 
need to judge (27). Levis meditation on the grey zone was partly moti-
vated by the many representations which he felt trivialised the Holocaust. 
He singles out popular history, the history taught in schools, and feature 
films as particularly predisposed to the simplifying trend he identifies, the 
Manichean tendency which shuns half-tints and complexities, and resorts 
to the black and white binary opposition(s) of friend and enemy, good 
and evil (22).  
The concept of the grey zone is important as it destabilises clear-cut 
distinctions, such as those noted above, and warns against hasty moral 
judgement, or, in some cases, calls for it to be withheld entirely. For these 
reasons, an acknowledgement of the grey zone complicates representa-
tion, which Levi shows to be strongly related to judgement. Commenting on 
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the complexity of the camp experience and the human need or desire for 
simplification early in his essay, Levi writes: 
The network of human relationships inside the Lagers [camps] was 
not simple: it could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and 
persecutors. In anyone who today reads (or writes) the history of the 
Lager is evident the tendency, indeed the need, to separate evil from 
good, to be able to take sides, to repeat Christs gesture on Judge-
ment Day: here the righteous, over there the reprobates (23). 
Here, the notion that simplification results from passing moral judgement in 
and through representation is clear. Indeed, Levi opens his essay by 
stressing the prominent − even necessary − place of simplification in hu-
man affairs: What we commonly mean by understand coincides with 
simplify: without profound simplification the world around us would be an 
infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and 
decide upon our actions (22). To put the problem Levi evokes briefly, un-
derstanding requires representation, which involves moral judgement, re-
sulting in simplification. While Levi focuses primarily on Auschwitz, his de-
tailed case study of Jewish leader Chaim Rumkowski suggests the associ-
ated problems of judgement and representation apply more widely to the 
ghettos as well. 
Levis essay focuses primarily on those prisoners who inhabited posi-
tions as Kapos (chiefs) of labour squads, members of the Auschwitz Son-
derkommandos forced to work the extermination machinery, and Rum-
kowski. Levi stresses that when confronted by the difficult issue of Jewish 
collaboration, moral judgment would be better entrusted to those who 
found themselves in similar circumstances, and had the possibility to test 
on themselves what it means to act in a state of coercion (28-9). However, 
survivors of the Holocaust who could confidently claim that they faced a 
similar situation to Rumkowski are few, if any. In any case, Levis essay it-
self creates the impression at times that the obstacles to judging these 
privileged Jews apply not only to those who did not experience the camps 
and ghettos, but also to those who did. In the case of the Jewish Sonder-
kommandos at least, Levi is explicit: I repeat: I believe that no one is 
authorised to judge them, not those who lived through the experience of the 
Lager and even less those who did not live through it (42). This suggests 
that survivor testimony may also be a potential source of unwarranted 
judgements. Indeed, in the chapter preceding The Grey Zone, Levi medi-
tates on what he calls the marvellous but fallacious instrument of memory. 
Reflecting on the bearing this has on judgement, Levi writes that judges 
themselves know very well how it almost never happens that two eyewit-
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nesses of the same event describe it in the same way and with the same 
words, even if the event is recent and neither of them has a personal inter-
est in distorting it (11). He goes on to write that the extreme situations of 
the Holocaust complicate matters even more. 
Much has been written on the actions of Rumkowski and the Jewish 
Councils in general, however no substantial attention has been given to the 
role of moral judgement in survivor testimonies.6 There is also an ever-
expanding literature on the problem of representing the unrepresentable, 
or, in the phrasing of the seminal collection of essays edited by Saul Fried-
lander, the limits of representation.7 In a sense, the problem of judgement 
in survivor testimony (or any other representation, for that matter) may be 
approached as one such limit. Robert Rozett writes that firsthand ac-
counts of Jews cannot clarify the Nazis motives or plans, but can only 
teach us about the effect of the horror on the individual victims and the ex-
periences of the victims facing the horror.8 This acknowledgement of per-
spective does not detract from the crucial importance of survivor accounts, 
however an awareness of the subjective nature of diaries, memoirs and 
oral testimonies does raise important ethical questions when considering 
how survivors represent the situations, experiences and behaviour of vic-
tims other than themselves. Most Jews who held leadership positions in the 
ghettos of Eastern Europe did not survive, and the diary of Warsaw Juden-
rat official Adam Czerniakow, is one of few testimonies that have filtered 
down to us, albeit posthumously.9 The vast majority of the victims who Levi 
includes in The Grey Zone have not left an account for posterity, Rum-
kowski included. 
Merging the generic boundaries of survivor account and philosophical 
reflection, Levi tentatively takes it upon himself to testify to the experiences 
and behaviour of privileged Jews. At the same time, he warns against any 
moral judgement of them, drawing himself into a paradoxical situation. In 
the case of the Sonderkommandos, Levi declares that our need and ability 
to judge falters, stressing that we should meditate on the story of the 
crematorium ravens with pity and rigour, but that a judgement of them be 
suspended (41, 43). Likewise, Levi clearly states that the same impotentia 
judicandi paralyses us when considering Rumkowskis leadership of the 
Lodz ghetto. While we should not condemn Rumkowski, he writes that we 
cannot absolve him on the moral plane either (43, 49). In short, Levi holds 
that certain Jews in extremis should not be condemned or absolved for 
their actions, suggesting that representations of these victims require some 
form of sustained ambiguity. Nevertheless, the separation of representation 
and judgement is far from simple, if not impossible. Although a moral 
judgement of privileged Jews may be illegitimate, representations of such 
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individuals in survivor testimony reveal that it is also impossible not to judge 
them. Indeed, even Levi himself cannot avoid judging those he argues 
should not be judged. While his use of the Italian word collaborazione does 
not evoke the negative connotations often associated with its English trans-
lation, Levis judgement of privileged Jews is evident in various ways 
throughout his essay, as evidenced in his representation of the Jewish 
Sonderkommandos, discussed elsewhere.10 Likewise, the paradox of 
judgement is exemplified in Levis representation of Rumkowski. Paradoxi-
cally, it would seem, the grey zone warns against judgement but at the 
same time requires it.  
 
II. Representing Rumkowski: “King of the Jews” 
Levi concludes his essay on the grey zone with a detailed discussion 
of Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski (1877-1944), the elderly, failed Jewish in-
dustrialist who served as the president of the Lodz ghetto from October 
1939 to August 1944. Due to being located in Polands most important 
manufacturing region, Lodzs financial and material value to the Nazis 
helped ensure it was the longest surviving of all the ghettos. However, de-
spite only being surrounded by barbed wire and board fences, the Lodz 
ghetto has been described as more hermetically sealed off than the walled 
Warsaw Ghetto.11 Facing severe food shortages, the ghettos peak popu-
lation of 750,000 was continuously whittled away by starvation, disease 
and deportations. By maintaining the levels of production required by the 
Nazis, the Jewish communitys officials believed that even as the extermi-
nation of Jews was well under way (although the time at which this became 
clear to Jewish leaders is difficult to evaluate), at least a small number 
could be saved. This seems to be the theory on which Rumkowskis actions 
were based, and he was not unique among Judenrat leaders in thinking 
this. Rumkowski was appointed Älteste der Juden (Elder of the Jews) in 
late 1939. The fact that all other members of the Jewish Council were exe-
cuted and replaced soon after, and that Rumkowski himself later died in 
Auschwitz, demonstrates the precariousness of such a privileged position. 
Rumkowski oversaw the running of the ghetto until its liquidation just 
several months before the wars end. It has been hypothesised that without 
the Soviet armys controversial decision to delay its advance into Poland by 
halting at the Vistula River, little more than 100 kilometres from Lodz, up to 
80,000 Jews may have been saved and Rumkowski may even have been 
remembered as a hero.12 Nonetheless, for various reasons, Rumkowski 
has arguably become the most despised privileged Jew in all survivor tes-
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timony. Even Jacob Robinson, who vigorously defended the Judenräte 
against Hannah Arendts polemics, holds that Rumkowskis behaviour is 
open to criticism.13 Although Levis negative judgements of Rumkowski 
are usually (though not always) more subtle than others, they are still 
clearly evident throughout The Grey Zone. 
A key aspect of the paradox of judgement in Levis essay is the simul-
taneous characterisation of the grey zone as indecipherable realm and 
moral spectrum. While Levi invariably treats the grey zone metaphorically, 
the concept also possesses a spatial element, with the word zone connot-
ing a physical area that is cut off. In light of Levis warning against judge-
ment in the case of privileged Jews, the term grey zone suggests an in-
decipherable realm of ambiguity, in which pre-existing moral frameworks do 
not apply. As Levi writes early in his essay: The world into which one was 
precipitated was terrible, yes, but also indecipherable: it did not conform to 
any model, the enemy was all around but also inside, the we lost its limits 
(23). However, at various points throughout Levis essay, the grey zone 
also gives the impression of constituting a moral spectrum, along which its 
inhabitants can be situated. Expanding the grey zone to incorporate more 
than only victims in the camps and ghettos, Levi writes at one point that 
within [the grey zone] must be catalogued, with different nuances of qual-
ity and weight, Quisling in Norway, the Vichy government in France, the 
Judenrat in Warsaw, the Saló Republic in Italy, right down to the Ukrainian 
and Baltic mercenaries employed elsewhere for the filthiest tasks (27-8, 
emphasis added). Here, Levi implies that the Judenräte, which includes 
Rumkowski, may be compared with collaborators whose level of coercion 
was of an entirely different kind, if coercion existed at all (which in some 
cases it did not). Indeed, the fact that the collaborationist Vichy regime in 
Frances unoccupied zone was arguably motivated by strong anti-Semitism 
and often acted in anticipation of German orders, would seem to disqualify 
any comparability with the forced cooperation of Jewish leaders.14
Levis interest in Rumkowski was piqued long before he wrote The 
Drowned and the Saved. Indeed, the analysis he provides here is almost 
identical to an earlier attempt to come to grips with the Jewish leader in his 
Story of a Coin, which began as a newspaper article and was eventually 
published in 1981 in his collection of short stories, Moments of Reprieve.15 
The fact Levi had previously written only about settings and situations he 
had witnessed or experienced directly is indicative of his personal compul-
sion to explore Rumkowskis leadership of the Lodz ghetto. While Levi is 
not, at least consciously, prepared to condemn Rumkowski, he writes that 
his apparently natural will to power does not exonerate him from his re-
sponsibilities, declaring that: 
░    Traumatic Memory and Holocaust Testimony 135 
If he had survived his own tragedy, and the tragedy of the ghetto 
which he contaminated, superimposing on it his histrionic image, no 
tribunal would have absolved him, nor certainly can we absolve him 
on the moral plane. But there are extenuating circumstances: an in-
fernal order such as National Socialism was, exercises a frightful 
power of corruption, against which it is difficult to guard oneself  
To resist it a truly solid moral armature is needed, and the one avail-
able to Chaim Rumkowski, the Lodz merchant, together with his en-
tire generation, was fragile (49-50). 
While this passage highlights the inefficacy of legal institutions and moral 
faculties in judging privileged Jews, Levis argument that Rumkowski 
should not be judged is contradicted by his suggestion that the Jewish 
leader had contaminated the ghetto, a statement which distracts one from 
the extreme coercion that he and other Judenrat officials experienced. Hav-
ing already mentioned the production of ghetto currency, stamps and songs 
that Rumkowski had dedicated to himself, Levi masks the judgement be-
hind his comment that his subject forced his histrionic image on the 
ghettos inhabitants. It would also seem paradoxical to critique the moral 
framework of individuals living in an extreme situation that is itself beyond 
evaluation according to contemporary moral standards. 
Conceding that Rumkowskis position was intrinsically frightful, Levi 
writes that the four years of his presidency or, more precisely, his dictator-
ship, were an astonishing tangle of megalomaniacal dream, barbaric vital-
ity, and real diplomatic and organizational ability (45). While Levi portrays 
Rumkowski as demonstrating, at times, a genuine concern for many of his 
subordinates, he also characterises him as possessing an arrogant sense 
of self-importance that proved detrimental to many of the ghettos Jews. His 
representation of the much-reviled Jewish leader is replete with negative 
descriptors, such as authoritarian, renegade and accomplice (44, 46). 
Levi also links Rumkowski with the moral standards (or lack thereof) that he 
perceives in the Kapos, describing him as a corrupt satrap who displays 
the identification with the oppressor he had condemned so strongly earlier 
in his essay (46, 32). Indeed, Levi becomes more explicit towards the end 
of The Grey Zone, not only drawing a parallel between Rumkowski and 
the Kapos and Lager functionaries, but also the small hierarchs who 
serve a regime to whose misdeeds they are willingly blind; of the subordi-
nates who sign everything because a signature costs little; of those who 
shake their heads but acquiesce; those who say, If I did not do it, someone 
else worse than I would (50). By generalising Rumkowskis complicity in 
this way and making reference to the postwar excuse common among per-
petrators, Levi verges on blurring the distinction between victim and perse-
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cutor, a distinction he had gone to great lengths to underline several pages 
earlier. 
Confidently claiming that Rumkowski passionately loved authority, 
Levi positions him as a self-proclaimed King of the Jews who rode 
through the streets of his minuscule kingdom, streets crowded with beggars 
and postulants (45). This reflects the fact Levi was heavily influenced by 
Leslie Epsteins controversial novel, King of the Jews, which was also ini-
tially to be the title of his Story of a Coin. By turns scandalous, compas-
sionate and perverse, the protagonist of Epsteins fictionalised narrative 
develops an almost mythological aspect, fluctuating between dedicated 
representative and egotistical dictator of the ghetto.16 While Levis repre-
sentation also shifts between positive and negative evaluations of Rum-
kowskis character, the manner in which he passes judgement on the Jew-
ish leader is evident in the way he frequently prefaces his critical comments 
about him. When Levi writes that his subject must have progressively con-
vinced himself that he was a Messiah, it is probable that Rumkowski 
thought of himself not as a servant but as a Lord, and he must have taken 
his own authority seriously (46, emphasis added), one might question the 
validity of making such assumptions under the extremely complex circum-
stances at issue. In any case, Levis rhetoric clearly displays the moral 
evaluation he otherwise seeks to withhold, and it is evident that he expects 
his reader will adopt his judgment. 
Furthermore, in the same way that Levi implies the Kapos and mem-
bers of the Sonderkommandos were to some extent naturally predisposed 
to their positions of privilege,17 there is a strong sense that he thinks the 
same of Rumkowski. After explicating the addictive and corruptive qualities 
of power, he writes: If the interpretation of a Rumkowski intoxicated with 
power is valid, it must be admitted that the intoxication occurred not be-
cause of, but rather despite, the ghetto environment; that is, it is so power-
ful as to prevail even under conditions that would seem to be designed to 
extinguish all individual will (49). Significantly, this is the first time in his 
essay that Levi explicitly prioritises the influence of the human predisposi-
tion to compromise − in this case, Rumkowskis alleged lust for power − 
over the impact of external factors, namely the choiceless choices im-
posed by the Nazi regime in order to pursue their goals.  
Most tellingly of all, when Levi states that Rumkowski must be placed 
in this band of half-consciences, he adds that whether high or low it is dif-
ficult to say (50). The imagery invoked of a band along which privileged 
Jews are situated returns us to the paradoxical conceptualisation of the 
grey zone as both indecipherable realm and moral spectrum. Reflecting 
on where Rumkowski should be positioned on this moral continuum, Levi 
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gestures at the impossibility of judgement through his expression of uncer-
tainty, his acknowledgement that it is difficult to say. This call for sus-
tained ambiguity is also clear in Levis rhetorical movement from the par-
ticular to the universal, with the end of his essay transforming into a general 
digression on the corruptive influence of power. Having doubted ones abil-
ity to judge the Jewish leader, Levi states: We are all mirrored in Rum-
kowski, his ambiguity is ours (50). Nonetheless, Levis judgement is clari-
fied in his allusion to Shakespeares Measure for Measure, which com-
pares Rumkowski with Angelo, the plays devious and hypocritical villain, 
who uses his position of power for his own personal gain and attempts to 
have a man executed for a crime he himself commits.  
Levis search for a universal lesson in the experiences of the am-
biguous figures of the grey zone, who are both ostensibly beyond, but at 
the same time subject to, his judgement, is clear in the closing lines of his 
essay. Here, Levi essentially provides a self-reflexive, pessimistic extrapo-
lation from the historically specific ethical dilemmas facing privileged Jews 
to a despairing social commentary on human nature: 
Like Rumkowski, we too are so dazzled by power and prestige as to 
forget our essential fragility: willingly or not we come to terms with 
power, forgetting that we are all in the ghetto, that the ghetto is 
walled in, that outside the ghetto reign the lords of death and that 
close by the train is waiting (51). 
Raniero Speelman writes that this may be the most pregnant of Levis say-
ings and the nucleus of his philosophy. These words link the Shoah to us, 
just like we are already linked to the Shoah.18 Indeed, in placing us in the 
position of Rumkowski − or at the very least acknowledging the possibility 
that we may logically be faced with such pressures under the same circum-
stances − Levi makes a genuine, if unsuccessful, effort to abstain from 
passing judgement on the Jewish leader. 
 
III. The Persistence of Judgement: Representations of Rumkowski in 
Recent Survivor Testimony 
The tension between representation and judgement can also be seen 
in the testimonies of two survivors of the Lodz ghetto, both of whom lost 
their entire families during the Holocaust. One of these survivors is Abra-
ham Biderman, who spent several years in Lodz before being incarcerated 
in Auschwitz and several other concentration camps. In his recent memoir 
entitled The World of My Past (1995), Biderman provides a detailed ac-
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count of his firsthand experiences, but also occasionally draws on secon-
dary sources to contextualise his memories within a broader historical 
framework. While he does not always reveal his sources through endnotes, 
it is clear that his frequent references to Rumkowski are influenced by other 
texts.  
Biderman quotes Rumkowskis speeches and written proclamations at 
length, listing the boasts, threats and promises he made towards the ghetto 
population, and labeling him a traitor.19 Although he briefly mentions that 
Rumkowski was beaten by the Nazis, Biderman accuses the Jewish leader 
of acting like a medieval despot who play[ed] poker with the devil.20 He 
frequently contrasts Jews who accepted privileged positions with those he 
describes as heroes without medals, the thousands of unknown and 
honourable people who refused to bend or be degraded.21 Even more 
judgmentally, and in a manner that arguably overlooks the coercion the 
Judenräte were subjected to, Biderman holds that under Rumkowski, the 
Lodz ghetto functioned autonomously with German precision. Likewise, he 
implies a high degree of free will when he claims that Rumkowski allowed 
the Germans to use him as their tool in the destruction of his people [em-
phasis added].22
Later, however, in a section titled The end of an emperor, Biderman 
changes his approach substantially. Contradicting his earlier assertion that 
Rumkowski played a leading role in the drama,23 he acknowledges that 
the circumstances dictated by the Nazis meant that Rumkowski had no 
control over the fate of the ghettos Jews. In the same passage, Biderman 
fluctuates between describing Rumkowski as a hostage, a pawn, a tool in 
the hands of a most brutal monster, and emphasising what he perceives to 
be his lack of integrity and leadership qualities, his efficiency in following 
through on German demands, and his failure to refuse the privileges 
given to him.24 He condemns Rumkowskis apparent acquiescence to the 
Nazis demand for children as a fatal, and unforgiveable mistake, and at-
tributes the longevity of the ghetto solely to the Nazis greed. Biderman 
dismisses all positive appraisals of Rumkowski on this point in the process, 
even though he admits the Jewish leader negotiated the quota of the 
ghettos first deportation down to half its initial number.25
Nonetheless, upon narrating Rumkowskis violent end in Auschwitz, 
Biderman is prompted to question his and others ability to judge him. De-
scribing Rumkowski as beaten half-unconscious upon arrival at the camp 
before being thrown straight into an open furnace by other prisoners, 
Biderman asks: 
Was Auschwitz the place for justice? It is hard to be a hero. It is just 
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as difficult to be a judge. I am only a survivor, a witness telling a 
story the way it unfolded in front of my eyes. And my story is a testi-
mony to all those who lived and died behind the barbed wires of the 
Lodz ghetto. I leave it for history to judge.26
Here, Biderman connects his testimony to the absence of a testimony by 
Rumkowski, one of the many who, metaphorically at least, lived and died 
behind the barbed wires of the Lodz ghetto. While negative evaluations of 
Rumkowskis behaviour proliferate in Bidermans memoir, this self-reflexive 
passage injects a moment of doubt into the survivors representation. In his 
final questioning of the possibility of judgement, Biderman reveals that he 
too is caught in the paradox of judgement evoked by Levis grey zone. 
The recent testimony of Jacob Rosenberg, an award-winning writer 
and another survivor of the Lodz ghetto, further reinforces this. In his semi-
autobiographical, semi-fictional work, East of Time (2005), Rosenberg con-
structs a mosaic of Jewish experiences in the ghetto. As he notes in the 
preface to his book: The anecdotes, incidents and characters that appear 
throughout these pages come directly from my memories − although some 
names have been changed, and occasionally I have succumbed to the sto-
rytellers prerogative (and delight) in a measure of embellishment, not to 
say invention.27 This admission, like Levis acknowledgement of the falli-
bility of memory, underlines the status of testimony as re-presentation. 
In the main, Rosenberg represents Rumkowski, one of the few charac-
ters in his text to be referred to in several sections, judgmentally. The nar-
rators initial references to Rumkowski display familiar moral judgements, 
describing him as a king and puppeteer who mimicked the Nazi state, 
and could definitely not be regarded as a disappointment to his bosses.28 
A detailed description of Rumkowskis perceived elitism, eager subservi-
ence to the Nazis, and the hatred he inspired in the ghetto follows. In the 
chapter titled Give Me Your Children!, which recounts the speech in which 
Rumkowski announced the order for children to be deported, the narrator 
negatively portrays him as an inexplicable enigma: More than six decades 
later, I still keep wondering what sort of a man can bring himself to utter 
such words.29
Shortly afterwards, however, in a digression on the hierarchical pyra-
mid of the ghetto, of which Rumkowski inhabits the top, the narrators tone 
changes briefly, leaving the reader to contemplate the Jewish leaders di-
lemma from a point of attempted empathy. Expressing his dislike of Rum-
kowski, the narrator nevertheless questions: 
But where is the man who can state with conviction whether Rum-
kowskis decisions were a product of bravery or of cowardice? His 
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lot was lonely, to be sure, and very far from easy. Did he have a 
choice? Perhaps he did, and perhaps he didnt  And in the end, 
who knows how many times, during sleepless nights, this man who 
projected such strength and confidence shrank back in horror at the 
echo of his own fateful words: Mothers, give me your children!?30
In a similar way to Levi and Biderman, this passage, a rupture in the narra-
tives critique of Rumkowski, reveals a fleeting − yet strong − degree of un-
certainty, both towards the previously demonised figure and towards the 
capacity for moral evaluation under extreme circumstances. Although not 
essential to the last line, a question mark is nonetheless provided. Even so, 
the paradoxical tension between the impossibility and inevitability of 
judgement continues, as Rosenberg immediately follows this section with a 
vignette depicting a mans grief and subsequent suicide at having lost his 
wife and child to the deportations, perhaps reinvigorating his prior condem-
nation of Rumkowski.31
In any case, the uncertainty on the part of Rosenberg is evidently in-
tended to be taken on by the reader, perhaps moving towards the open-
ended, sustained ambiguity that Levis grey zone calls for. Rosenbergs 
memoir raises a crucial point that cannot be easily set aside: like most 
privileged Jews, the only words about Rumkowski that we lack and can 
never obtain are his own. Indeed, Levi himself writes that only Rumkowski 
could clarify his situation if he could speak before us, even lying, as per-
haps he always lied, to himself also; he would in any case help us under-
stand him, as every defendant helps his judge (50). Here again, Levis dis-
course still betrays his judgement of Rumkowski while simultaneously em-
phasising the need to withhold it. It would seem that the tension between 
representation and judgement in Holocaust testimony is ongoing. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Drawing on Levis grey zone and stressing the collapse of former 
ethical frameworks based on notions of dignity and freedom in the post-
Auschwitz world, contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues that 
the knowledge that human life continues in the most extreme degradation, 
knowledge that is imparted to us through survivor testimony, now becomes 
the touchstone by which to judge and measure all morality and all dig-
nity.32 However, this is further complicated when judgements proceeding 
from the inevitable subjectivity of survivor experience and testimony are 
brought to bear on such controversial figures as Rumkowski, who, unlike 
some Jewish leaders, left no testimony of his own. To adopt legalistic ter-
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minology, with survivors positioned as figures of judgement over defen-
dants who have no means to account for themselves, and indeed with tes-
timony itself an inherently judgmental act, it is clear that the representation 
of privileged Jews such as Rumkowski remains a particularly fraught is-
sue. 
When it comes to the problem of judgement and representation, the 
traumatic memories of survivors pose stark problems. Although a moral 
judgement of Jews in extremis may be illegitimate, as Levis essay on the 
grey zone suggests, representations of such individuals in survivor testi-
mony reveal that it may also be impossible not to judge them. Reflecting 
the paradox of judgement evident in the concept of the grey zone, the 
representations of Rumkowski by Levi, Biderman and Rosenberg all clearly 
exercise moral judgement. While the self-reflexive moments of uncertainty 
visible in these testimonies can be seen to approach the kind of ambiguity 
that Levis grey zone seems to require, it is perhaps the case that such 
moments are overwhelmed by the judgements throughout. Not all survivor 
testimony condemns Rumkowski, however. 
In a recent compilation of fragments of survivor testimony titled Forgot-
ten Voices of the Holocaust (2005), Rumkowskis name appears several 
times. Stressing the dire circumstances imposed on the Lodz ghetto, Pol-
ish-Jewish survivor Roman Halter, whose testimony earlier in the book had 
criticised Rumkowskis request for Jewish children, maintains that: It is im-
portant not to accuse Rumkowski and others who were running the ghetto, 
but to see it now as a totality of what was imposed from Hitler and Himmler 
down to other SS  I dont really hold it against Rumkowski and the other 
ghetto leaders. It was terrible when he said voluntarily, Please give up your 
children, but these times were abnormal, so horrendous, that one cannot 
rationalize in the circumstances in which we live today, how people be-
haved and what they did.33 Whether or not this constitutes absolving Rum-
kowski of wrongdoing, a judgement Levi also warned against, is open to 
debate. It is highly significant that this fragment is located by the editor in a 
section entitled Forgiving and Forgetting.  
Earlier in the book, a fragment by Lodz survivor Michael Etkind also 
mentions Rumkowski, overtly refusing to judge him (although he does use 
the word collaborate). Etkind, who held a privileged position of a different 
kind as a member of the ghettos postal service, addresses the issue of 
survivors judgements of the Jewish leader, thus it would seem fitting to end 
with his words: 
Some resented Rumkowskis role in the ghetto, but many did not. 
Had he survived he would have been murdered after the war; as it 
was he was killed in Auschwitz. But indirectly, because of him, more 
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people survived in the Lodz ghetto (for longer) than in any other; not 
those he meant to survive − himself, his family and his friends - but 
people like myself. He did collaborate  Those he put on the depor-
tations list, because they were not working, hated and resented him; 
but the people who because of him survived, were very grateful to 
him  It is impossible to judge.34
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